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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH .

JOSEPHINE O. GARRAND,
for herself and as

vs.
LEONARD J.

RICHARD L. BIRD
333 East 400 South #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF RELIEF

..............................................

2

STATEMENTS OF FACTS ........•...........•.................. , 2
ARGUMENT
I.

II.

3

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF
RES JUDICATA ................................... .

3

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT LEONARD GARRAND
·SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CHILD SUPPORT
FOR JOSEPH PHILLIP GARRAND BEYOND THE AGE OF
21 IS INEQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE VACATED CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ....... .

5

INDEX OF CASES
Searle Bros. et al v. Edlean Searle
6 December 1978, Supreme Court Case No. 15604

4

Dehm v. Dehm,
Utah ~~~~-'545
Pacific -~2-n~d~5~2~5~(~1~9""'7,...,6,..,.)- ............................... .

5

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Section 78-45-3 and 4 UCA 1953 ............................

1

Section 15-2-1 UCA 1953 ...........•................ · · · •. · ·

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NATURE OF RELIEF
Appellant, requests this court to rule that the trial
court erred in requiring Leonard J. Garrand to continue paying
support for Joseph Phillip Garrand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Leonard J. and Josephine Garrand were divorced in 1969.
Mr. Garrand, pursuant to stipulation was ordered to pay alimony
to Josephine in the sum of $250.00 per month and was ordered
to pay support for Carla Garrand and Joseph Phillip Garrand in
the sum of $150.00 per month per child.

At that time, an

acknowledged fact taken into consideration by the court was that
Joseph Phillip Garrand was a retarded person.

(See paragraph 3,

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, dated 10 October 1969).

In

1976 Josephine filed a petition to increase the alimony and
support.

The trial court, acting through Judge Jay Banks, in-

creased the support for Joseph Phillip Garrand to a sum of $250 .00
per month, effective 15 April 1977.

The court terminated support

money for Carla Garrand as of March 1977 for the reason that Carla
reached her 18th birthday at that time.

The alimony was in-

creased from $250.00 per month to $375.00 per month, conunencing
15 April 1977.

The modification order was appealed and the Utah

Supreme Court held that the District Court was not bound to
terminate the daughter's support payments on her 18th birthday,
but could continue them until she reached 21.
on that point.

The case was rernande:

The result of the decision in the Supreme Court

and the remand order was that the trial court was to take evidence
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on the question as to whether or not extraordinary circumstances
existed which would justify an order of child support for Carla
between her 18th and 21st birthday.

This point has not been

pursued and Carla has now passed her 21st birthday.
Josephine Garrand then (in October of 1978) brought a
separate action as Guardian ad Litem for Joseph Phillip Garrand
which had as its objective support past majority.

It is from the

ruling of Judge Leary which awarded Josephine Garrand $150.00 per
month support that Leonard Garrand appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION .To·
DISMISS BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
The case of Garrand vs. Garrand, District Court Civil
No. 186725 litigated the issue of support for Joseph Phillip
Garrand and disposed of that issue when it modified Leonard
Garrand's obligation with regards to the payment of child ·support.
(See Paragraph _3, Order Modifying Decree, 19 April 1977).

What

Josephine Garrand is attempting to do in this action is to
fasten Leonard Garrand with an obligation for support, which Judge
Banks refused to do in his order of 19 April 1977, after the
question of support for Joseph Phillip Garrand had been litigated.
See Paragraph 4, Conclusions of Law, dated 19 April 1977, signed
by Judge Banks, which states as follows:
"Under the original decree in this action, the obligation
for support continued as to the son Jo-,;eph until he reached
age 21, which matter continues to be justici~le under the
amendment to Section 15-2-1, UCA, 1953 by this court and
because of special circumstances as to Joseph, the support
should conti~ue to ag~ 21."

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
-3Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See also Paragraph 3 of Order Modifying Decree, 19 April,
.1977, which increased the support for Josep 11 Phillip to $2.5!J.OO
per month.
The court's attention is also invited to Paragraph 5 of
Josephine's Petition for Modification, dated October, 1976, which
states as follows:

v.

"Plaintiff has never threatened to discontinue support
for the son, Joseph, and the silence of the decree as to
the period of this support should be clarified and should
continue as long as such help is needed."

Leonard Garrand's response to this allegation and to the
allegation that Carla should recieve support past majority are
contained in Leonard Garrand's Counter Petition, Paragra?h 5,
wherein Leonard Garrand denies Josephine's claim for support for
Joseph Phillip past majority.

These allegations .are alluded to .

I

indicate to this court the fact that the issue asserted by Josenhine;
in this action were, in fact, thoroughly litigated in her Petition
for Modification in 1976.

If Josephine objected to Judge Banks'

order regarding ongoing support for Joseph Phillips, she should
have appealed this issue.

Instead s~e appealed another issue and

then brought a new law suit.
The recent case of Searle Bros. et al vs Edlean Searle, 6
December 1978, Supreme Court Case No. 15604 discusses the application of the doctrine of res judicata to divorce cases.

Justice

Ellett, speaking for the court, states the rule which is applicable,
to facts of this case:
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judgments, is
conclusive as to the oarties and their orivies and o~erates
as a bar to any subsequent action.
In order for judicata to
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apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their
privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes
the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated
as well as those that were in fact litigated in the orior
action."
The court then states the rule as to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel as follows:
"Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from a
"different cause of action" and prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit."
Thus, even if the subsequent lawsuit brought by Josephine
Garrand to compel support from Leonard Garrand is characterized
as a different cause of action, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is applicable to bar her claim due to the fact that the
facts and issues in the subsequent suit were fully litigated in
the 1976 Petition for Modification.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT LEONARD GARRAND SHOULD BE
REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CHILD SUPPORT FOR JOSEPH PHILLIP
GARRAND BEYOND THE AGE OF 21 IS INEQUITABLE AND SHOULD
BE VACATED CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
Dehm vs. Dehm 545 P2d·525 (1976) established authority of
the court to make an order of support beyond age 21, but it doesn't
make such an order manditory.

The judge is empowered to consider

the wife's increased alimony, her employability and all other
relevant circumstances in determining the husband's obligation.
The evidence adduced at the original hearing for Modification
1976 - 1977 and at the subsequent hearing in 1979, indicated that
Josephine Garrand is a woman with a profession possessing the
qualifications to be employed as a registered nurse.

The evidence

further indicated that Josephine Garrand is a woman who has
substantial means, i.e. $7,000.00 in a checking account and
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a home located on the east bench in Salt Lake City, <.vhich i.;;
free and clear of any incumbrances.

~otwi t!1standing

these resources

Mrs. Garrand has refused to work, by her own admission, because
she "just doesn't want to".

Mrs. Garrand, notwithstanding these

facts, recieves $375.00 per month by way of alimony pursuant to
Judge Banks' order in April of 1977.

Leonard Garrand has faithfully

paid his child support and alimony obligations plus attorney's
fees since the original divorce decree in 1969.

It is extremely

unjust and inequitable to require to pay ongoing support and
$375.00 per month alimony under these facts.
For the reasons submitted above, Leonard J. Garrand, Appellant,
through counsel, Stephen L. Johnston, esq. requests the court render
an order which has the effect of vacating the order requiring
Leonard J. Garrand to continue child support payments for Joseph
Phillip Garrand beyond the age of 21 years.
DATED this

'dC{i:b

day of October, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

Steph
P.O. Bo 1025
431 South 300 Eas , Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorney for Appellant
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